Prompt injection is still not a bug you can patch
Prompt injection is a property of language models, not a bug. Simon Willison's lethal trifecta turns an unsolvable problem into a design decision about containment.
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Notes from Nodal Studio on cybersecurity as AI agents move into production: why agent frameworks and prompt injection widen the attack surface, what AI-driven vulnerability research is really finding, and what incidents like the Hugging Face breach teach about monitoring, identity and response. Every article comes as a short read and a sourced deep dive.
Prompt injection is a property of language models, not a bug. Simon Willison's lethal trifecta turns an unsolvable problem into a design decision about containment.
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